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Drivers of Farm Succession and Inheritance  
Abstract 
Farm succession and inheritance is increasingly considered a complex phenomenon 
which not only affects core dimensions of farm family life but also the agricultural 
sector more widely. Intergenerational farm transfer in particular is increasingly viewed 
as fundamental to the sustainability and development of global agriculture. In the 
majority of EU countries, the average age of farmers is increasing, while the number of 
farmers under 40 years of age is decreasing. There is growing concern that this 
demographic trend may have negative impacts on the agricultural industry because it is 
younger and not older farmers who are associated with more efficient and effective 
production practices. The question of what motivates decisions to transfer farms is a 
complex one, and research to date has not apparently enlightened agricultural policy to 
the extent that current trends towards an ageing farm population are being managed. 
This research aims to investigate economic and financial aspects of the policy drivers of 
farm succession and inheritance in Ireland to understand what it is about the policy 
environment that is failing to stimulate higher levels of farm transfer.  It draws on the 
Teagasc National Farm Survey data which provides Irish data to the Farm Accountancy 
Data Network in the European Commission. A hypothetical microsimulation model is 
used to investigate economic factors of farm transfers, with scenarios created to test 
these factors and their impacts on the transfer process. The Net Present Value (NPV) of 
income streams for farmers and their successors are calculated to assess which scenarios 
have the highest/lowest financial effects. The findings illustrate a range of possible 
scenarios for farm succession/inheritance, with some results indicating that under 
current policy retaining a farm until death may be more economically beneficial to a 
farmer than transferring land before death. 
Key Words: 
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Introduction 
The process of farm succession and inheritance is highly complex and involves a variety 
of actors, ranging from family members to professionals providing advice on legal and 
financial matters (Williams, 2006). In most European countries the family farm model 
is the predominant form of ownership, meaning that farm transfer commonly takes 
place generationally. Much of the literature highlights that inheritance is the dominant 
means of entering farming (Kelly, 1982; Taylor et al., 1998; Hennessy and Rehman, 
2007). Factors affecting the decision to transfer a family farm can be both social and 
economic, with some farmers aiming to ensure all family members are catered for when 
the farm is transferred, while policy effects and economic concerns of capital taxes and 
future income can also have a very strong influence on farmer choices. In many 
developed countries there is concern over the ageing farming population. The average 
age of farmers in the United States, for example, is 57 (Mills-Novoa, 2011) while 
almost one third of farm holders in Europe are over the age of 65 (Zagata and 
Sutherland, 2015). More than half of farmers in the UK are over 55 (ADAS, 2004). In 
Ireland, the 2013 Teagasc National Farm Survey showed the average age of farmers as 
57, with this figure increasing marginally year on year over recent decades, and the 
number of farmers under 40 years decreasing over the same period of time.  This trend 
has become a source of major concern for the agricultural sector, given the evidence of 
a positive correlation between younger farmers and farm efficiency/innovation (Potter 
and Lobley, 1996; Lobley, 2010; Howley et al., 2012). In increasingly globalized and 
competitive agricultural markets it is argued that the most productive and efficient 
farmers should be working in the sector (Williams, 2006; Zagata and Sutherland, 2015). 
In the Irish context, a stifled land market has resulted in very low land mobility and 
there is a clear pattern of capital accumulation amongst older farmers who are fearful 
about their financial future and unwilling to transfer their farm assets (Matthews, 2014).  
Furthermore, state assistance to agriculture provides direct payments to farmers, making 
it financially beneficial to hold on to agricultural land rather than selling it. The result is 
a sector dominated by older farmers, with access for young farmer an increasingly 
problematic issue.  
Historically, there has been no substantial long term EU policy put in place to 
encourage timely transfer of farms or even to assist in the process of gradually handing 
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over managerial control to younger farmers. Early Farm Retirement Schemes (EFRS) 
are one of the mechanism that have been used in attempts to reduce the average farmer 
age and increase the entry of young farmers. These schemes were optional and mainly 
taken up by Ireland, France and Greece (Davis et al., 2013). Whilst there have been 
three rounds of EFRS in Ireland, in 1993, 2000 and 2007 (Teagasc, 2007), all were 
short-lived and said to have represented little value for money in the sense that they 
only succeeded in incentivising farmers who were already close to retirement, rather 
than a fundamental restructuring of the age profile of Irish farmers (although they did 
show a small but temporary level of success in that regard) (Hennessy, 2014). Similar to 
the Irish experience, Caskie et al. (2008) found that in France and Greece the EFRSs did 
not bring about any deep-rooted change to farm transfer trends, as farmers entering the 
scheme were already close to retirement age. In the UK, Ingram and Kirwan (2011) 
evaluated the Fresh Start Initiative, a scheme which matched new entrant farmers with 
retiring farmers as a means of giving younger farmers a start and older farmers a 
gradual exit strategy. However, this was not seen as hugely successful because there 
were insufficient profits from some partnerships to sustain two salaries.  In the case of 
New Zealand, the dairy industry does have a well-developed career structure which 
gives young farmers the opportunity to begin farming and has exit schemes available for 
older farmers such as phased exit strategies (CIAS, 1996). For dairying, this works on 
the basis of share milking, which enables younger farmers to begin farming whilst 
allowing older farmers to gradually exit. Up to 35% of dairy farms in New Zealand are 
share farms (Curran, 2014). For all of these schemes, getting to the point of transfer at 
an earlier stage is the main issue. One obvious incentivising factor for farm transfer 
concerns the need for the retiring farmer to have sufficient income in the form of a 
pension or other resources. This is connected in turn to the need for a farm to be viable 
in order to attract and support a new entrant. The extent to which these are influencing 
factors in farmers’ decisions to retire and transfer their farm is not clear. 
A key aim of this discussion is to critically analyse aspects of prevailing policy with a 
view to identifying the ways in which it influences decisions relating to succession and 
inheritance. It specifically examines the effect of a range of policy mechanisms 
including taxation and other financial instruments that control the options for farm 
transfer and the implications for farmers’ decision-making in this regard.  It focuses on 
the Irish context where there has been a recent surge in farming interest on the part of 
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young people. Enrolments for agricultural degree and training programmes are at an all-
time high, illustrating a strong intention to pursue farming as a primary career choice 
(Heanue and O’Donoghue, 2014). At the same time the availability of farms to facilitate 
entry of younger farmers is critically low. The paper first briefly outlines the most 
common forms of farm succession and inheritance and the ways that these have been 
typically framed within agricultural policy prescriptions. Then, taking data from the 
Teagasc Irish National Farm Survey of 2013, it applies a microsimulation model to 
analyse the financial implications of policies and individual choices on succession and 
inheritance decision-making. It draws on the concept of risk to interpret the underlying 
processes driving decisions on succession and inheritance, exploring, for example, the 
extent to which the policy domain may be contributing to farmers’ potential sense of 
vulnerability and insecurity about post-farming livelihoods and how it is mitigating 
against attempts to bring about a restructuring of farming in favour of younger farmers. 
The concept of risk in the agricultural policy domain 
The main policy instruments available to governments are financial e.g. tax relief or 
grant based schemes. Essentially, governments use financial incentives to encourage 
individuals to undertake measures that achieve strategic governmental aims (for 
example Food Harvest 2020 targets). In the agricultural sector, aims such as 
environmental conservation are achieved using agri-environmental schemes; these 
schemes generally benefit farmers economically (Morris and Potter, 1995). Entering 
financially incentivised schemes reduces uncertainty around income for farmers, thus 
reducing their perceived economic risks (Koundouri et al., 2009). While it has been 
argued that farmers are generally risk averse (Groom et al., 2008), there has been no 
specific research investigating whether or not farmers perceive succession and 
inheritance processes as a risk. Recent research has indicated that farmers with children 
between the ages of 5 and 19 tend to be more risk averse (Loughrey et al., 2015). This 
implies that farmers with potential successors may avoid risk where possible; however, 
generalisation based on very few studies to date cannot be made. 
Overview of current Irish transfer policy environment 
At present, certain financial incentives are in place to encourage early transfer of Irish 
farms, however, the level of influence and impact the current incentives have on 
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succession and inheritance decisions is yet to be determined. These incentives take the 
form of a range of taxes and duties applying to farm transfer and inheritance.  
In Ireland, there are three capital taxes that apply to farm inheritance; they are Capital 
Gains Tax (CGT), Capital Acquisitions Tax (CAT) and Stamp Duty. CGT applies only 
to the farmer transferring land out of their name and it is charged at 33% of the value 
the property gained between date of acquisition and date of sale/transfer. CAT is 
applicable to the successor and is charged at 33% of the value of the property acquired 
(over and above the relevant relief threshold bands in table 1). Like CGT, CAT reliefs 
are available up to certain asset value thresholds; these reliefs are dependent on the 
relationship between the farmer and successor (i.e. son, daughter, niece, nephew etc.). 
In recent years these thresholds have decreased dramatically (See table 1) leading to a 
disincentive to take on farm land and assets in some cases, however 2015 marks the first 
year since 2009 that these limits have increased. Stamp Duty is also applicable to the 
successor, with this being charged at 2% of the value of the property, but can be reduced 
to 1% based on the relationship of the farmer to successor (McDonnell, 2014). If the 
successor is a son/daughter of the farmer, and is under the age of 35 with a minimum 
level 6 agricultural certificate, stamp duty is reduced to zero. Other policy incentives to 
facilitate earlier transfer in the Irish case are young farmer top ups on Basic Farm 
Payments (BFP) and other direct payments. Farmers under the age of 40 who have a 
minimum level 6 agricultural certificate may receive a 25% top up on their BFP 
(maximum limit of 50 hectares).  
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Group Relationship to  
Disponer 
 
8/4/09  
to 
31/12/09 
1/1/10 
 to 7/12/10 
8/12/10  
to  
06/12/11 
07/12/11 
 to 
05/12/12 
6/12/12 
to 
13/10/15 
14/10/15  
to 
 present 
A Son/Daughter €434,000 €414,799 €332,084 €250,000 
 
€225,000 
 
 
€280,000 
B 
Parent*
1
/Brother/ 
Sister/Niece 
/Nephew 
/Grandchild €43,400 €41,481 €33,208 €33,500 €30,150 
 
 
 
€30,150 
C 
Relationship 
other 
 than 
 Group A or B €21,700 €20,740 €16,604 €16,750 €15,075 
 
 
 
€15,075 
Table 1. Capital Acquisitions Tax Thresholds 2009 - 2013 
Farmer response to economically incentivised policy 
*In certain circumstances a parent taking an inheritance from a child can qualify for 
group A threshold 
The above describes the current Irish policy situation, but in the Irish context, as in 
many developed countries, motivating farmers to implement farm level change is a 
challenge for all agricultural policy formulation. Vanclay (2004) for example asserts 
that the farming community is heterogeneous, with great variance amongst farmers; 
therefore, it can be very difficult to create policy that will be accepted or effective in a 
high number of cases. In his discussion, Vanclay (ibid) lists 27 social principles for 
agricultural extension within which is the affirmation that ‘farmer motivation exceeds 
any rational economic decision’ (p. 214). Briassoulis (2008) alludes to the same notion, 
in stating that ‘the era of ‘one-size-fits-all’ theories in land use policy and planning is 
ended’ (p.29). One possible reason for this could be the notion that agricultural policy is 
created on a reactive basis as opposed to a proactive one (Hill, 2000). Norton (2004)  
also refers to this issue in the context of policy in general, stating that policy reforms 
only address one issue at a time, as opposed to creating a strategy around what direction 
the sector affected should take. The most common reactor within agricultural policy 
often contains some form of economic incentive as farmers in many incidences are 
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drawn to policy that proves financially beneficial. One such example would be the agri-
environmental schemes implemented in European countries through Common 
Agricultural Policy reforms. In the UK, for example, farming in an environmentally-
friendly manner in Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESAs) was financially rewarded. 
Morris and Potter (1995) however, refer to ESAs as a ‘new source of subsidy’ (p.53) 
that was welcomed by farmers. They question the extent to which such payment 
amounts to ‘buying changes’ which would not otherwise occur, thereby strengthening 
the notion that farmers can in fact be led by financial incentives. Similarly in Ireland, 
the Rural Environmental Protection Scheme (REPS) became very popular with farmers, 
especially those on lower farm incomes. Emerson and Gillmor (1999) argue that 
‘undoubtedly the main reason why many farmers adopt the REPS is financial’ (p.244). 
Similarly, Brouwer (2004) implies that in the area of cross-compliance farmers are 
economically driven, stating that the correct incentive must be in place to motivate 
farmer participation in any scheme or programme. However, in the area of succession 
and inheritance it is yet to be determined if a significant number of farmers can be 
influenced by such policy change.  
Impact of farm viability on transfer 
Farm viability is another distinct issue of relevance for Ireland, with 33% of farms in 
2013 being categorised as vulnerable (Teagasc NFS, 2013) and a further 35% in the 
category of ‘viable’. Viable here denotes a farm that has the capacity to pay family 
labour at the average agricultural wage and provide a 5% return on all non-land assets; 
while vulnerable denotes that the farm is not viable and neither farmer nor spouse have 
a source of off-farm income. This can have a strong effect on farm transfer because a 
low farm income leads to concerns over the farm being capable of providing an income 
for both the farmer and/or the successor. This can also result in problems of adequate 
retirement income for the farmer, leading to land retention as a form of financial 
security.  
Succession effects 
While farm viability can be of great importance, the possibility that viability may be 
increased or decreased is implied by Potter and Lobley (1996). They have coined the 
terms ‘succession, successor and retirement effects’ with each having a different impact 
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on a farm’s trajectory. The succession effect implies that farmers with successors are 
more likely to invest or expand in anticipation of a takeover of the farm by a son or 
daughter than those who do not have a successor. In contrast to this, Loughrey et al. 
(2015) found that farmers with more children between the ages of 5 and 19 were more 
risk averse. While risk and expansion are not the same phenomenon they may be 
correlated; indicating further research may explain the variance of these results. Potter 
and Lobley (ibid.) argue that ‘farmers without successors and those with low 
expectation of succession seem significantly more likely to be disengaging from 
agriculture’ (p.329). Several authors have attained research results which confirm the 
existence of the succession effect (Burton and Walford, 2005; Shawyer, 1990; Calus et 
al., 2008). The successor effect refers to the positive impact which a successor can have 
on a farm once he or she becomes actively involved in the running of a farm and 
decision-making processes. This also includes the period in which a successor assumes 
full or gradual managerial control. Generally young farmers returning from agricultural 
education are more aware of new technologies or wish to implement change on their 
own farms resulting in increased efficiency and output (Potter and Lobley, 1996). The 
final effect mentioned by Potter and Lobley (1996) is the retirement effect, which 
generally has a negative impact on farms i.e. the process of semi-retirement tends to be 
characterised by de-intensification and liquidation of assets if there is no successor 
present. It refers to the period in which a farmer is coming near the end of his or her 
farming career, where the impacts for the farm are most serious when a successor has 
not been identified. 
While the positive effects of the presence of a successor can generally be measured (e.g. 
farm expansion), other immeasurable outcomes can stem from the succession effect. 
Fischer and Burton (2014) contend that farm succession as socially-constructed 
phenomenon necessitates a sustained engagement and process of socialisation of the 
successor with the farm from early childhood in order to form the kind of ‘successor 
identity’ (pp. 417) needed to effect farm takeover (Brandth and Overrein, 2013).  
Drawing on the social constructivist framework of social identity to explain the 
formation of farming identities, they develop the concept of endogenous succession 
cycles to interpret the trajectory that underpins succession outcomes.  This is built on 
three intertwined and mutually-reinforcing processes; the construction of successor 
identities; the progression on the farm ‘ladder’; the development of farm business 
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identities (424).  Under this social constructivist perspective, succession is therefore not 
so much an outcome of a set of rational choices or of specific policy interventions, but 
more about how the successor’s gradual identity development has come to reflect the 
sustained and complex set of experiences, interactions and expectations that relate to 
that specific farm.  For them, the policy requirements of what is essentially a farm-
specific phenomenon are measures that protect and sustain endogenous cycles which in 
turn ensure the ongoing socialising of particularly during hardship periods or other farm 
crises, or that may be disrupted due to farm modernization or regulatory change. 
In many cases farmers are reluctant to retire and thus retain farm ownership/control well 
past normal retirement age. This in turn affects the age at which a successor may 
become actively involved in farm decision making. There are various reasons of both 
economic and non-economic origin that contribute to the reluctance of farmers to retire. 
Riley (2012) extensively discusses the impact of farm retirement on social and cultural 
identities, particularly of males in farming, where farming and social relations were 
tightly intertwined and the idea of disrupting these is resisted, where there are conflicted 
emotions about cutting generational ties to farming, and where adaptation to life away 
from farming proves difficult. Conway et al. (2016) similarly allude to the non-
economic reasons that influence such a decision, including the impact on a sense of 
personal identity closely connected to farming as the way of life and unwelcome 
reminders of mortality. These effects are all considerable for farm families, but in turn 
each of the effects mentioned could potentially impact on global agricultural output 
levels. Figures 1 and 2 show the increase in farm income until the farmer reaches his or 
her late 30s, with income decreasing thereafter. This indicates that for a farm transfer to 
have a positive economic impact on the farm, transfer should ideally take place before 
the successor is 40. This data concurs with the idea of a succession and successor 
effects. A slight peak appears around age 50 for both farm systems, which may be a 
result of farmers having identified successors by this age and thus begin expansion. 
However, a dip occurs at age 55 contradicting this argument. Further probing of NFS 
data may reveal the reason for this. 
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Figure 1 Dairy market gross margin per hectare, by age ( Teagasc NFS, 2013)2 
 
Figure 2 Beef market gross margin per hectare, by age (Teagasc NFS, 2013) 
Methodology and Data 
The area of farm succession and inheritance lends itself to a high level of complexity 
given the factors involved such as the wide-ranging impact of such a decision on the 
lives of the farmer, successor, and their families (Inwood and Sharp, 2012). 
Nonetheless, the levels of complexity must be extracted so that the chosen scenarios can 
be used to analyse the economic impact of different routes to succession and 
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inheritance. Microsimulation is the most appropriate methodological approach as it 
allows for complexity to be removed to an extent and an assessment of different 
changes to be made at a micro level (O’Donoghue et al., 2014). This method facilitates 
the projection of income streams for both parties, whilst allowing for farm level changes 
(such as income increase/decrease and farm size adjustment) to be made for each 
scenario. Methods used will be outlined further in this section.   
Measures of Impact/Analytical Measure 
Net Present Value (NPV) is defined as ‘the difference between the present value of all 
cash inflows (benefit) and the present value of all cash outflows (cost)’ (Jechlitschka et 
al., 2007, p.113). Values such as income stream will be discounted to the present value. 
Bacidore et al. (1997) argue that the NPV of a business can be greatly affected by 
strategies adapted for the future of the business, here; the strategy of the farm business 
is based on the succession/inheritance decision made. Using NPV’s for the farmer and 
successor will indicate the future income streams both would acquire in the scenarios 
modelled. A Net Present Value (NPV) figure will be calculated for each scenario using 
a microsimulation model; the outcomes will then be compared focusing on the policies 
and motivations which affect each decision. Together with the NPV, a replacement rate 
will be calculated for the farmer in each scenario. This will be calculated by dividing 
income at age 66 by income at age 65 i.e. retirement replacement ratio. 
                  
            
             
       
This formula is an edited version of the replacement ratio formula presented by Turley 
and Maloney (1997). The average net replacement rate for an Irish male is 45% (OECD, 
2012), with the average for all OECD countries being 66%.  
Policies and motivations 
Modelling different scenarios of succession and inheritance decisions allow for the 
comparison of NPVs, which will result in the most economically beneficial succession 
and inheritance scenarios to be established. Each scenario is affected differently by 
policy and the decisions taken are a result of various motivations. Table 2 lists the main 
policies and motivations that will affect each scenario. 
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Main policies and motivations affecting succession/inheritance 
Policies Motivations 
CAT – Agricultural relief Age 
CGT – Retirement relief Income  
Stamp Duty – Consanguinity relief Health 
Young Farmer Top Ups Increased leisure time 
 Financial security  
 Education 
Table 2. Main policies and motivations affecting succession/inheritance 
Base farm 
To ensure each scenario is comparable two base farms will be used for this research, 
using capital taxation rules from 2014. The farms will be based on the NFS average data 
for a cattle rearing and dairy systems, as these are the most dominant farm systems in 
Ireland. In the case of the cattle rearing farms modelled, all farmers/successors qualify 
for farm assist payment based on the low income level. The figures are as follows: 
Average Cattle Rearing Average Dairy 
Family Farm Income €9,541 Family Farm Income €62,994 
Machinery €17,717 Machinery €57,218 
Livestock (Breeding) €26,534 Livestock (Breeding) €85,569 
Trading €16,855 Trading €27,867 
Land and Buildings €577,615 Land and Buildings €973,079 
UAA 38.1 ha UAA 55.4 ha 
Total cattle number 61 Total cattle number 143 
Table 3. Average Cattle Rearing/Dairy Data ( Teagasc NFS,2013) 
Farmer and successor characteristics used will be as in table 4; these characteristics are 
applied so that the farmer and successor qualify for maximum capital tax reliefs. A 
farmer aged 35 or under is considered a young farmer for capital tax reliefs. In the 
scenarios modelled the successor will be the child of the farmer. While a farmer over 65 
is considered to be at retirement age and is eligible for a contributory state pension 
(hereafter referred to as state pension) at age 66 (depending on contributions made, for 
all scenarios it is assumed the farmer has made full contributions). In addition, 
modelling with the farmer being aged 65 will allow for a comparison of pre and post 
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retirement income. An age based tax credit is also available in Ireland on reaching age 
65. The characteristics used here are: 
Farmer Successor 
Age: 65 Age: 35 
Married  Education: Level 6 Ag. Education 
Pension: Contributory  Single 
No off farm job Off farm job (€25,000 income) 
Table 4. Farmer/Successor characteristics 
Scenarios 
The scenarios selected for this research are based on the predominant routes to 
succession that are available in Ireland and the most highly documented routes in 
literature (Hennessy and Rehman, 2007; Kelly, 1982). As illustrated above, there are a 
range of motivations and policies affecting the succession and inheritance decision. 
Many of the factors listed in table 2 will be significant in the hypothetical scenarios.   
Expected outcomes 
It is expected that scenarios where tax reliefs are optimised will be the most 
economically beneficial to the farmer and successor, however, ages, income levels and 
asset values should have the biggest effect on policy drivers. Policies aimed at 
increasing land mobility should minimise land transfer costs and incentivise farmers to 
transfer land earlier, however, direct payments may make it more economically 
beneficial to the farmer to delay transfer until death. These payments may result in land 
retention by older farmers, as they provide a steady source of income into retirement, 
Replacement rates for some farmers may be lower than the averages mentioned above, 
based on a common lack of strong retirement income planning among the farming 
community. In section 4 the outcomes of each scenario will be discussed. 
Focusing on two hypothetical farms will allow for the sensitivity of farms to policies to 
be tested while avoiding the complications that would arise were this study to be 
undertaken on a real farm. Variables such as farm size, income, and livestock units can 
be held constant which may not always be the case in reality. Adjusting aspects of the 
farms will test the effects of succession/inheritance policies on income (including future 
income represented as NPV) and capital tax implications. 
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Hypothetical microsimulation modelling 
Microsimulation models use data on micro-units (e.g. households, firms, farms, etc.) to 
simulate the effect of policy or other socio-economic changes on the population of 
micro-units (Mitton et al. 2000). The need for microsimulation arises from the difficulty 
of observing simultaneously the outcomes for the same micro-unit under a treatment 
and in the absence of a treatment (e.g. policy change), and also crucially as a tool to 
understand the complexity of a policy problem. The result of the microsimulation 
models can be affected by many factors, which makes it difficult to illustrate the effect 
of a single factor. Hypothetical models, on the other hand, often focus on a particular 
scenario under certain predefined assumptions. This allows the model developer to 
examine a simplified version of the simulated observation (O’Donoghue et al., 2014). 
Microsimulation techniques have become a much used instrument for their ability to 
provide an assessment of differing scenarios and facilitate decision making (Spadaro, 
2007). In this case, microsimulation will be used to inform decisions regarding farm 
transfer. Focusing on a hypothetical farm will allow for the sensitivity of farms to 
policies to be tested while avoiding the complications that would arise were this study 
to be undertaken on a real farm. Farm level decisions are not always rational or 
economically driven (Vanclay, 2004; Howley et al., 2012), but this method facilitates 
the simulation of decisions based on economic incentive as opposed to basing decisions 
on non-economic phenomena. Adjusting aspects of the farm will test the effects of 
succession and inheritance policies on income and capital tax implications. 
Data requirements 
The data being used here is hypothetical farm level data, each scenario described above 
requires information on a range of variables, namely: age of farmer/successor, incomes 
for both parties (on and off farm), type of pension (farmer/spouse), asset values (land, 
machinery, livestock, direct payments received, and personal asset values). This data 
will then be used in the model to generate a NPV for both parties involved. As 
discussed in section 2, NFS average figures for cattle rearing and dairy farms will be 
used for the base farm, with farmer and successor ages and incomes being simulated so 
that they qualify for maximum capital tax reliefs. Section 3 will describe each scenario 
to be modelled in detail. 
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Results 
Routes to succession 
As mentioned above, there are a range of routes to farm succession/inheritance; 
nonetheless, there are only a certain number of choices available to both farmers and 
successors. The variety of transfer options available were considered leading to the 
scenarios below, these scenarios will be modelled in section 4. In the scenarios 
presented, it is assumed that the NFS average figures for cattle rearing and dairy apply. 
For clarity of results, scenarios labelled ‘A’ will apply to cattle rearing systems, and 
scenarios labelled ‘B’ will apply to dairy systems. As mentioned, there are a range of 
other possible situations involving farm transfer; however the two shown here best 
illustrate the policies associated with farm transfer and how they may have an effect on 
succession and inheritance processes. Below the scenarios are outlined. 
Scenario 1 – transfer at death 
In this scenario the farmer retains ownership and use of all farm assets until death, 
resulting in financial security and retirement income for his lifetime. Transfer on death 
results in no CGT applying to the transfer, as this tax applies to the farmer only. This 
can be a financial burden for those transferring their land to another party. The farmer 
will acquire the state pension (contributory) from the age of 66 which will be 
supplemented by farm income. On death of the farmer, the successor will inherit all 
farm assets. This scenario is not uncommon in farming with farmers often being highly 
reluctant to retire, one reason for this being a lack of available retirement income (Riley, 
2014). In addition, Terres et al. (2015) highlight that farmers in general will not exit 
agriculture unless their income becomes very low. In the case of this scenario the 
farmer’s income should increase on reaching age 66 as a result of farm income and 
pension combining. Thus, there would be little incentive for the farmer in this situation 
to transfer the farm before death.  
Scenario 2 – transfer at death (destocking and retaining payments) 
The farmer here will destock to the minimum level necessary so that he/she may receive 
Less Favoured Area (LFA) payment (0.15 livestock units/Ha), retain their SFP, and still  
acquire a state pension. The pension figure here will depend on Pay Related Social 
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Insurance (PRSI) contributions, the number of dependants the farmer has, their age and 
if they are living alone. The maximum weekly pension allowance here would be 
€230.30 and the minimum would be €92. The farmer is motivated to destock so as to 
cut down on labour input and thus increase leisure time. Retaining ownership of the 
farm will result in the farmer remaining eligible for the LFA and SFP, whilst also 
providing financial security to provide for long term care requirements should they 
arise. Gullifer and Thompson (2006) assert that farmers may disengage with their work 
as they age; this is essentially what is occurring in this scenario. Similarly, Kristensen et 
al. (2004) found that older farmers are more likely to engage in extensification and in 
some cases land abandonment. However, the factors listed earlier in table 2 would also 
contribute to the farmer’s decision to destock and reduce workload.  
Outcomes 
The scenarios described above were modelled on both a cattle and dairy farm using 
average farm system data from the 2013 Teagasc NFS. The results obtained from both 
systems for the two hypothetical scenarios are presented here (scenarios 1 and 2 – for 
cattle and dairy systems). Selection of the scenarios presented were based on the impact 
of changes in farming decisions on the income streams and income/capital taxes payable 
as measured by the NPV for the farmer and his/her successor. Table 5 shows the total 
NPV for each scenario, and also the individual NPV’s for farmer and successor. In this 
section analysis of the results will be discussed. 
Scenario NPV € 
1A NPV - Farmer 481,175 
 NPV - Successor 378,506 
 Total 859,680 
1B NPV - Farmer 957,801 
 NPV - Successor 410,382 
 Total 1,368,183 
2A NPV - Farmer 519,356 
 NPV - Successor 234,739 
 Total  754,095 
2B NPV - Farmer 639,177 
 NPV - Successor 383,567 
 Total 1,022,745 
Table 5. Net Present Values for farmer and successor 
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Scenario 1A – transfer at death (cattle rearing) 
The results for this scenario, an average cattle rearing farm, illustrate that on a farm 
where asset values and farm incomes are low then consequently capital taxes and 
income taxes are not payable or minimal. The NPV in total for such a farm is low. 
Tables 6 and 7 illustrate all income streams, income taxes and capital taxes for both the 
farmer and successor for the farm being transferred. 
 
Figure 3 Farmer – Scenario 1A: Cattle rearing farm transferred at death 
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Figure 4 Successor – Scenario 1A: Cattle rearing farm transferred at death 
For the farmer, income remains relatively stable from age 63 to 65. An annual 
exemption allows those who are over 65 and married to earn up to €36,000 tax free. 
Therefore, on reaching age 65 this tax exemption kicks in and so leads to a reduction in 
income tax payable and thus an increase in income. At age 66 there is a further income 
increase owing to the farmer being eligible for a state (contributory) pension. This state 
pension is not means tested and the farmer is therefore able to retain his/her farming 
income until death while also receiving the pension (for themselves and their spouse). 
As a result, income increases at 66 as the farmer’s pension and farming income 
combine. The farmer transfers the farm on death and is therefore not liable for CGT on 
the assets disposed of. The farmers spouse continues to receive a pension. In the case of 
the successor off farm income remains stable as they have an off farm job, when the 
farm is inherited income stream and income taxes increase. The farm is inherited at age 
47; which is above the age to qualify for reliefs on CAT and Stamp Duty; however the 
value of the farm is relatively low so no capital taxes apply here. 
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Scenario 1B – transfer at death (dairy) 
This scenario is the same as 1A but using average dairy figures, therefore incomes and 
asset values are higher. The results present a similar pattern to 1A, albeit at higher 
levels. 
 
 
Figure 5 Farmer – Scenario 1B: Dairy farm transferred at death 
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Figure 6 Successor – Scenario 1B: Dairy farm transferred at death 
The farmer’s income increases when they reach retirement age, while the successor’s 
income does not increase until the farm is inherited. Interestingly, even with higher 
asset values and incomes, the successor does not have to pay any capital taxes on 
inheriting the farm as a result of capital tax reliefs.  
Scenario 2A – transfer at death (retaining assets and payments) (cattle rearing) 
Similarly to scenarios 1A and B, the farmer retains all payments and assets, and the 
successor inherits the farm when the farmer is deceased. However, the farmer destocks 
from 1.06 LU/ha to 0.15 LU/ha at age 65 so as to retain LFA payments and SFP while 
minimising labour. The successor has an off farm job and does not acquire the farm 
until the farmer is deceased.  
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Figure 7 Farmer – Scenario 2A: Cattle rearing farm transferred at death, 
farmer destocks to 0.15 LU/ha 
 
Figure 8 Successor – Scenario 2A: Cattle rearing farm transferred at death, 
farmer destocks to 0.15 LU/ha 
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The farmer acquires state pension at 66 as with the scenarios above. However, the 
increase in income is greater because the farmer has destocked from 1.06 LU/ha to 0.15 
LU/ha, thus reducing costs which impact the level of income (costs here are calculated 
based on livestock units, therefore direct costs are reduced on destocking). Pension and 
farm income combine to create the increased income stream for the farmer. The 
successor’s income remains stable given the presence of an off farm job, with an 
increase at age 47 when the farm is inherited. Capital taxes do not affect the successor 
here, as the value of assets being transferred are below the thresholds.     
Scenario 2B – transfer at death (retaining assets and payments) (dairy) 
As with 2A, the farmer destocks to 0.15 LU/ha (from 1.8 LU/ha as this is the average 
stocking rate for a dairy farm) so as to retain LFA payments and SFP while minimising 
labour. The successor has an off farm job and does not acquire the farm until the farmer 
is deceased. In this case, the asset values and income streams are based on average dairy 
farm figures from the 2013 Teagasc NFS. 
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Figure 9 Farmer – Scenario 2B: Dairy farm transferred at death, farmer 
destocks to 0.15 LU/ha 
 
Figure 10 Successor – Scenario 2B: Dairy farm transferred at death, farmer 
destocks to 0.15 LU/ha 
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For the farmer in this scenario, destocking from 1.8 LU/ha to 0.15 and acquiring 
payments does not result in the income increase modelled in scenario 2A. In contrast, 
income decreases when the farmer destocks on reaching the age of 66. Income tax 
decreases significantly for the farmer at this age as pension income and farm payments 
make up the main income stream as opposed to farm income alone. Also age credit is 
applicable from 65 reducing taxes further. The successor does not benefit from farm 
transfer until the farmer is deceased. Then income stream and thus income taxes 
increase when off farm income and farm income are combined. Even with average dairy 
data, capital taxes do not apply to the successor as the asset values fall below the 
applicable relief thresholds (for parent to child transfers). In spring 2015 EU milk 
quotas were abolished (Lapple and Hennessy, 2012) giving rise to opportunities for 
dairy farmers in the EU to expand. This in turn increases the possibility of greater 
profits in the dairy sector meaning a higher likelihood of dairy farms being capable of 
generating sufficient income for two generations. 
Farmer replacement rates 
For all scenarios, a replacement rate for the farmer was calculated by placing total 
income at 65 over total income at 66 (when pension age is reached). This allows us to 
assert whether the farmer benefits economically under each scenario. Table 6 presents 
the replacement rates (in percentages) of the incumbent farmer in each scenario. 
Scenario Replacement rate (%) 
1A 143% 
2A 165% 
1B 127% 
2B 59% 
Table 6. Replacement rates for farmers 
For all scenarios the replacement rates are high compared to the average replacement 
rate for Ireland (45%) as discussed earlier. The highest replacement rate is for scenario 
2A (165%) in this case, the farmer retains his/her cattle farm income into retirement 
combined with pension income (as opposed to pension replacing farm income). In 
addition to this, the farmer destocks to a minimum level of 0.15 LU/ha so as to retain 
LFA payments and BFP. Scenario 2B has the lowest replacement rate at 59%, this is a 
result of the dairy farm destocking to 0.15 LU/ha from 1.8 LU/ha, meaning a reduction 
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of income for this farm. Even though replacement rate is the lowest in the sample, it 
remains well above the Irish average of 45%. Also, the farmer’s leisure time would be 
greatly increased as a result of the low stocking rate, with labour requirement decreasing 
as a result. 
Discussion and Policy Recommendations 
While succession and inheritance can be a highly complex area, the deconstruction of 
the problems associated with these processes will aid policy makers in generating more 
effective solutions. Notably, the policy making process requires a level of assessment 
prior to this occurring. Based on the findings of this research, there are clear economic 
concerns regarding farm succession and inheritance with the the most notable concerns 
being the ability (or inability) of a farm to generate enough income to support both a 
farmer and their successor, and also the residual income of the farmer should they 
transfer the farm prior to death. Incidence of capital taxation has little economic impact 
in any of the scenarios modelled, despite taxation being cited as one of the main reasons 
Irish farmers attended nationwide Teagasc Transferring the Family Farm (TFF) clinics 
held in autumn 2014, this result was acquired from a survey conducted at said clinics. 
This indicates that taxes may be perceived as a large financial risk for farmers when 
transferring land. Further research and more in-depth analysis is required to fully assess 
the impact of these taxes.  
Suitability of capital tax reliefs  
In all average scenarios (for both cattle rearing and dairy) that have been modelled, 
capital taxes do not apply where the successor is a son/daughter of the farmer. The 
thresholds for tax reliefs, although they have reduced over time, remain relatively high. 
Such reliefs in cases where the successor is not a son/daughter of the farmer are much 
lower, modelling scenarios in which the successor is a niece/nephew or non-blood 
relation will provide more insight into capital tax reliefs and how they impact different 
categories of farmers/successors. Given the high number of farmers indicating they have 
no successor (48%) in Bogue’s (2013) report reliefs for this category may become more 
pertinent; as a lack of successor may indicate that some farmers who have no successor 
may have no children. In these instances transfers would be to other relatives (except 
those who come under favourite niece/nephew – see table 1) or non-relatives in which 
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cases there would be much higher capital taxes accrued. Nonetheless, the results 
indicate that the most common form of farm transfer (parent to child) does not result in 
capital taxation for average dairy and cattle rearing farms. Despite the high number of 
farmers attending Teagasc TFF clinics for farm transfer tax information, it would appear 
that only those with above average farm sizes and asset values would experience capital 
taxation. The high level of concern amongst farmers regarding capital taxation may be a 
result of societal influence. Negative experiences of farm transfer in which farmers 
incurred large tax bills may be sensationalised by the media and also within the social 
networks of some farmers, resulting in the risk of taxation unduly being of great 
concern to farmers. Continued dissemination of such relevant information on farm 
transfers by Teagasc using forums such as the TFF clinics will ensure that the farming 
community are aware of the factors and issues affecting farm transfer and so are more 
prepared for succession and inheritance.  
Policy incentives for farm exit  
It is evident from the results that farmers in the scenarios presented are not incentivised 
by any policy measures to transfer the farm early (i.e. before death). The promise of a 
steady income past retirement age could in fact encourage farmers to retain farm 
ownership. With lack of retirement income being mentioned by Riley (2014) as one of 
many reasons farmers are highly averse to retirement, it is expected that a high number 
of farmers may opt to defer farm transfer until death. Cases such as this may be 
contributing to the increasing number of farmers over the age of 65 in Europe (Zagata 
and Sutherland, 2015). Thus negatively affecting the entrance of young farmers into the 
sector which has been alluded to as essential for the development of agriculture 
(Williams, 2006). As such, if there is to be an increase in the number of young farmers 
in Europe, then there is a requirement to address the exit of older farmers so as to cater 
for the concerns and needs of both groups. Based on the tables illustrating the income 
streams of farmers it is apparent that there is a clear lack of policy facilitating farmer 
exit. As outlined previously, farmers respond positively to economic incentive 
(Brouwer, 2004; Sutherland, 2010) indicating that a policy of this nature may have a 
strong effect on the number of farmers exiting farming at retirement age. As mentioned 
heretofore the effects of EFRSs have been described by academics as of poor 
institutional value (Hennessy, 2014; Davis et al., 2013). Therefore the reintroduction of 
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an EFRS may not be a suitable solution to this issue; however it is apparent that current 
tax reliefs may not be ample to encourage older farmers to transfer land or to participate 
in a phased farm management transfer approach. The fact that farmers are not 
encouraged by a clear policy to retire or transfer land /management earlier indicate that 
the policies in question may have been created at higher levels of the EU as discussed 
by Keating and Laffan (1999). Additionally, the notion that policies will not be effective 
if they do not reflect ground level issues comes to the fore (Pieckzka and Escobar, 
2012). Here, young farmer entry is encouraged by certain incentives, but older farmer 
exit has received very little attention.  
Farm income: effects on succession and inheritance 
In scenarios 1A, 1B and 2A the farmer retains a steady income until death, in some 
cases farmer income even increases. Scenario 2B contrasts somewhat to the other three 
presented in that the farmer’s income decreases before death. This is a result of the 
farmer destocking from the average dairy stocking rate (1.8 LU/ha) which is higher than 
the average cattle rearing stocking rate (1.06 LU/ha). While a dairy system would have 
a reduced income as a result of destocking the farmer would benefit from decreased 
labour requirements. Reducing stocking rate is indicative of older farmer’s management 
behaviour with this phenomenon being highlighted by Kristensen et al. (2004). In a case 
such as this, the farm is capable of producing enough income for both the farmer and 
their successor should they take over control of the farm. Entering a period of semi-
retirement could be a viable option for farmers on farms with higher incomes. 
Researchers have found that some farmers planned to enter a stage of semi-retirement at 
the age of 65, in which the farmers would have a reduced role in managerial control and 
provide some labour input (Barclay et al., 2007; Kirkpatrick, 2012). Where this is an 
option a farmer may be able to transfer some level of farm management responsibility to 
their successors. However, it is also clear, given the average income figures for a cattle 
rearing farm that incomes are not high enough to support two generations 
simultaneously. Therefore, an inability of a farm to provide for exiting and entering 
generations has been cited as having an influence on the timing of farm transfer 
(Kirkpatrick, 2012), which can often be an issue for lower income farm systems.  
Therefore, there is merit to the notion that the level of income can be a contributing 
factor to a lack of business planning amongst those on more marginal farms (Tanewski 
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et al., 2000) and indeed where a farm not considered a viable business there may be a 
tendency to perceive planning as unnecessary. Nonetheless, the evidence presented 
within this study suggests that an average dairy farm may be able to facilitate two 
generations in terms of income. A development of policy to cater for the range of farm 
systems and income levels would be a positive step towards increasing the number of 
young farmers in the sector. However the other instrumental factors associated with 
transfer of farm management/ownership must be considered in tandem with the 
economic concerns.   
Young farmer definitions 
One issue which has been lobbied against in Ireland is the variance in definitions of a 
‘young farmer’ under different policies. In terms of BFP applications, a young farmer is 
40 years of age or younger, while in terms of capital tax relief a young farmer is 35 
years of age or younger (DAFM, 2009; Zagata and Sutherland, 2015). Given the rising 
average age of farmers, the cut off age to be defined as a young farmer may need to be 
higher to reflect the increasing age trend. Recent statistics show that at present, 10% of 
farmers in Ireland are aged 40 or under, with 7% of all farmers being under 35 years of 
age (NFS, 2013). This data implies that only 7% of farmers would be able to receive 
relief on capital taxes (provided they also have agricultural education) and young farmer 
top ups. However, those between 35 and 40 (3%) would only qualify for a 25% top up 
on their BFP; disparity such as this can cause confusion amongst the farming 
community and should be avoided.  
Direct payment dependence – policy lessons 
The research undertaken has revealed that a dependence on farm payments as a source 
of income into retirement years is a feasible option for older farmers. In scenario 1A, a 
cattle farmer could destock their land to the minimum level (0.15 LU/ha) to retain LFA 
payment and BFP, while also receiving a state pension. In this case, the farmer benefits 
more financially if they do not transfer the farm until after death. The effect of this 
delay in inheriting passes to the successor as they do not inherit the farm until the 
farmer is deceased. As a result, the successor may not have worked on the farm and may 
thus lack the managerial experience required to maximise farm income. It may be 
assumed in cases such as this that successors have acquired employment outside of 
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agriculture and therefore have very little experience of farm management. Gasson and 
Errington (1993) discuss ‘ideal’ types of intergenerational succession. One of these is 
entitled ‘standby holding’. This involves a successor taking on his or her own farm until 
their parents are ready to transfer the family farm, allowing the successor to gain 
managerial experience prior to taking over, thus preparing them for the management of 
the family farm once they acquire it. File and Prince (1996) document evidence of the 
correlation between family business failure and lack of succession planning, yet also 
report that successors in family businesses were self-reportedly unprepared for takeover, 
particularly where there was no succession plan in place.  For Weston (1977) the issue 
of management in succession is crucial to the continued success of the farm, and needed 
to be addressed from the earliest possible stage due to its potential to disrupt 
relationships between farmer and successor, and to ensure that both parties had a clear 
understanding of how the division of management responsibility would be handled.  
Avoiding ‘sudden, unplanned and significant change’ is cited as essential (Weston, 
1977, p.243). Hutson (1987) likewise details the nature of successor preparation for 
management as a sustained and complex one, especially on family farms where not only 
are there likely to be ideological and educational differences between farmer and 
successor, but where the wider context for farming is also under a state of constant 
change. Hutson (1987) also notes that successors in some small businesses have to 
compromise their ambitions for the family business until they gain managerial control, 
but that there was the risk that said ambitions may have faded by the time transfer takes 
place. As a potential way to address concerns regarding successor preparation, 
Errington (2002) discusses the idea of a ‘professional detour’. This is a period in which 
a young farmer acquires education or work experience not specifically related to 
agriculture. The successor may acquire skills that are transferable to farm management 
during their time away from the family farm. Weston (1977) likewise argues that 
training in areas such as business management may be just as beneficial as agricultural 
training to a young farmer. 
Successors may be averse to expansion or investment as they would most likely have 
gone past their late 30s by the time they inherit the family farm (Figures 1 and 2 
presented earlier illustrate the decrease in farm income after late 30’s, indicating a lack 
of investment/expansion after this age). Wilkinson (2012) alludes to a similar issue 
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noting that successors may not be willing to invest the required time or money needed 
to rejuvenate a farm once the retirement effect has taken place.   
 The fact that farmers may acquire payments while also receiving a pension indicates 
that there may have been an oversight from policy makers. Based on the stages of 
policy formulation discussed by Greer (2005) it may be the assessment stage that is 
being neglected. As mentioned, this is the stage of policy formulation in which previous 
policies are reviewed. In the case of CAP payments policy makers seem to have failed 
to notice this issue which continues to be a factor influencing intergenerational land 
mobility. The creation of a policy that does not allow farmers to retain farm payments 
when they acquire a pension may increase incidence of land transfer. However this may 
generate issues of retirement income for farmers, therefore the resultant issue of 
retirement income would need to be addressed. 
Conclusion 
The above discussion has sought to provide some explanation to the seemingly 
intractable problem of an ageing farmer profile coupled with a reluctance to engage in 
farm transfer, using Ireland as a case study example.  The extent to which this could be 
connected with a set of risk factors linked to current fiscal measures underpinning 
succession and inheritance was investigated.  This yielded a range of potential 
outcomes, indicating that the process is complex and specific to individual holdings and 
their particular structure and composition. Each route to succession and inheritance that 
has been discussed will have a different economic impact on the current and future 
income of all parties involved in farm transfer. The various means by which individuals 
undertake succession/inheritance is justifiable as there are a range of income levels, 
asset values, personal reasons and farm systems, meaning there is no single ‘optimal’ 
route to be taken. This variance in routes to farm succession and inheritance needs to be 
reflected in agricultural policy in order to facilitate the development of a sector that is 
efficient and sustainable (i.e. one which contains a significant cohort of young farmers). 
In the absence of a strong policy incentive, the average age of farmers may continue to 
rise resulting in a stagnant land market and indeed an agricultural sector that does not 
meet contemporary demands. 
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Future research 
One issue which has not yet been addressed in the modelling above is the cost of long 
term care and the effects of the Fair Deal Scheme
3
. This can result in an on-going 
expense for retired farmers or in some cases may be paid for by their successors. The 
cost of long term care can often be high adding to financial concerns around succession 
and inheritance i.e. if a farmer transfers the farm, will they be capable of paying this 
cost. Behavioural analysis of farmers around the time succession and inheritance takes 
place will also need to be undertaken to assist with understanding the actors and drivers 
most influencing the decision to transfer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 *The Fair Deal Scheme (Also known as the Nursing Home Support Scheme, is a scheme of financial 
support for people who need long-term nursing home care. Those who require care may apply for the 
scheme which will contribute to nursing home costs, along with a contribution from the applicant which 
is calculated based on income and personal assets. Those in receipt of the payment may defer their 
personal contribution until death, meaning a next of kin would pay the balance.  
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